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Abstract: There are common narratives about economic growth in Ethiopia. We analyze four common
narratives, namely, that (1) the economy is transforming from agriculture to industry, (2) that national
economic growth has been rapid and sustained, (3) that Ethiopia’s economy is largely agricultural,
and (4) that there is a looming debt crisis, largely due to lending from China. In many instances,
the justification for these narratives is based upon single years or specific data points. We examine
these narratives over the long term, to assess if they are supported by available macroeconomic
data. In doing so, we encountered significant issues with data quality and consistency. This article
presents the available datasets from 1999 to 2017 and concludes that the commonly made claims about
the Ethiopian economy are sometimes accurate, sometimes incomplete, and other times inaccurate.
We call for greater attention to primary data, and primary datasets, as opposed to relying upon
secondary summaries, single years, or specific data points to make generalized claims.
Keywords: Ethiopia; economy; growth; trade; export; import; debt
JEL Classification: A1; E6; O4; Y1
1. Introduction
There are dominant narratives about the Ethiopian economy that are often repeated, but
infrequently assessed for accuracy. The Government of Ethiopia has long been promoting the “Ethiopia
rising” image, academics have called it the “China of Africa” (Cowen 2018), international agencies
rank it as one of the fastest-growing economies in the world (World Bank 2018), and journalists
have lauded its miraculous transformation (Kopf 2017). One challenge to these narratives is a line
of questioning regarding the distribution of benefits of the growing economy—in other words, for
whom does the economic growth benefit, and at whose expense (Haylemariam 2017). Effectively,
this line of critique questions the accuracy of the data, as well as the relevance of the aggregate
narratives to lived experiences of the majority of Ethiopians. Aggregations have the potential to make
invisible rising inequalities, chronic poverty, and new vulnerabilities resulting from economic change.
These are important questions to ask, and critiques to make. With regard to inequalities, emerging
research is highlighting the manifestations of, and challenges brought about by, rising inequality
(e.g., Cochrane and Rao 2018; Rammelt et al. 2017; UNDP 2015). In this paper, we have a different
objective. We use primary datasets to assess if the common narratives are supported by the available
data, while recognizing that even those narratives that are supported by data may not necessarily be
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actual, as we identify indications of inaccurate data. In other words, we assess for internal consistency.
For example, we analyze if the narrative of the Government of Ethiopia is supported by its own data.
While high levels of sustained macroeconomic growth is one of the most common narratives about
the Ethiopian economy, it is not the only narrative that is common to the Ethiopian macro-economic
story. There are also narratives about economic transformation and, in particular, the diversification
of the economy into manufacturing, as opposed to being heavily reliant upon agriculture. A third
narrative surrounds the agricultural sector, and its critical role in the economy. A more recent narrative
is that of an emerging debt crisis and, in particular, the problematic role of Chinese lending contributing
to that. In this article, we return to primary data sources, and present long-term data in order to assess
the trends with regard to these narratives. We draw upon two datasets about economic growth, use
data on sectoral shares in the economy, analyze import and export trends, and explore the extent of
national debt. Few long-term assessments of the broader macroeconomy are available (Geda 2011), and,
as far as we know, there are no comparative studies of datasets or analyses of data consistency within
single sources. There are some papers that analyze long-term data, but focus on specific issues, such as
government expenditure (Menyah and Wolde-Rufael 2013) or exports (Allaro 2012). In highlighting
some critical issues about correcting narratives and data inconsistencies, we hope to encourage further
research of this nature.
Analyzing the narratives, claims made to support them, and counter-claims made against them,
is important. For example, there are claims made that the Government of Ethiopia posts higher
GDP growth rates than third party entities, such as the World Bank. Although commonly made
(e.g., Mandefro 2016; Mandefro and Jerven 2015), they are justified with reference to single data points
or specific years. The problem with these singular selections is that the data utilized may not be
representative of the trend, which is the case for GDP growth rates, as we show below. It is not only
researchers and journalists that create narratives. The Government of Ethiopia also presents narratives,
often framed within broader ideological foundations, such its presentation of transformation in the
context of the “developmental state”, or with reference to objectives, as they are outlined in the
Growth and Transformation Plans. The Ethiopian manifestation of the developmental state exhibits
typical characteristics of other developmental states: interventionist, strong, and vision-oriented
(Dejene and Cochrane 2018). The key architect, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, believed that
the developmental state allowed for the creation of effective and appropriate policies that can be
sustained over the long term (Clapham 2017; Zenawi 2012, n.d.). It is the developmental state that
is the foundation of some of the narratives evaluated in this article, such as in assuming that this
approach can lead economic transformation and facilitate rapid economic growth. These narratives are
codified as objectives within the Growth and Transformation Plans. The Ethiopian developmental state
has been able to foster positive changes, some of which are outlined in this paper, but has also come
alongside great costs, particularly in the realm of rights and freedoms (Dejene and Cochrane 2018).
This paper critically evaluates four narratives of the macroeconomy, however, it will also provide the
foundation for future research on a range of issues, including the Ethiopian developmental state.
In using data from the Government of Ethiopia, we do not suggest that it is always accurate. Our
analysis finds multiple inconsistencies and agrees with other findings that the statistics produced by
the government are problematic (Cochrane and Bekele 2018; IMF 2013). This critical assessment of data
and data quality is part of a broader recognition of challenges with governmental statistical agencies
and data throughout the Global South (Carletto et al. 2015; Jerven 2013; Sandefur and Glassman 2015;
Sundaram 2016). We conclude that the commonly made claims about the Ethiopian economy are
sometimes accurate, sometimes incomplete and, at other times, inaccurate.
2. Methodology
In order to assess the narratives, we have returned to primary datasets and analyzed the data
over the long term. The primary sources we have used on the economy are drawn from the annual
reports of the National Bank of Ethiopia, reports from the Ethiopian Customs and Revenue Authority
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(ECRA) and data from the Ministry of Trade. We have also used data from the World Bank and the
Observatory of Economic Complexity for comparative or complementary purposes.
Some of these datasets posed challenges. In particular, using the National Bank of Ethiopia as
one of the sources of the data was problematic on several accounts. First and foremost, the data is
inconsistent. For example, each annual report provides contextual and comparative data from past
years, but the data listed for a particular year varies from report to report. In the 2004/05 Annual
Report, the share of agriculture in the GDP for 2000/01 is listed as 45% while, in the 2005/06 Annual
Report, the share for 2000/01 is listed as 48.4% (NBE 2005; 2006; see Table 1 for examples). Public
annual reports from the National Bank of Ethiopia began in 2004/05 and, thus, for data on years
previous to this, we rely on reports published after this date. The challenge is that the data varies
based on which report is referred to. This poses significant methodological challenges. We have used
the oldest available report, 2004/05, to acquire the data for years previous to 2004/05. In the instance
that an annual report exists for a particular year, we use the data reported for the year of its publication
(in other words, we used the 2004/05 report for 2004/05 data). This is admittedly an arbitrary decision
on our part, however, we felt that the alternatives were either just as arbitrary or more problematic, in
terms of adjusting or recalculating data (and, thus, presenting figures not found in the National Bank
of Ethiopia reports).
Table 1. Example of Inconsistent Data: Agriculture as % of GDP.
Agriculture as % of GDP 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
2004/05 Report 45 49 44 47
2005/06 Report 48.4 47 43 45.1
2006/07 Report - 48.9 44.6 46.7
2007/08 Report - - 44.6 46.7
2008/09 Report - - 44.9 47.0
Source: NBE 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008.
There is no easy solution to rectify the inconsistent data for the years prior to 2004/05 (from which
the annual reports are available). This is particularly problematic because 3% of the GDP equates to
massive sums. However, the problem of data inconsistency does not only exist for data from before
2004/05, it also affects data in newer reports, reporting on past years. For example, there is an annual
report for 2004/05, in which agriculture, as a % of GDP, is listed as 48%, but, in the 2006/07 report,
the figure for 2004/05 (listed for comparative purposes) is 47%. Data inconsistency does not reduce
over time, and exists in more recent annual reports, as well. In the 2010/11 annual report, the share of
agriculture in the GDP was listed as 41.1%, and in the 2011/12 report the figure for 2010/11 is listed
as 45.3%.
The same problems exist for other data. Growth in real GDP exhibits the same inconsistencies. The
variances are just as wide; to give one example, real GDP growth was listed as 8.8% in the 2004/05
report, for that year, but in the 2011/12 report, the rate for 2004/05 was listed as 12.7% (NBE 2005, 2011).
Inconsistencies exist regarding export data, however, these were more minor in comparison to the other
datasets (export data is also made available by the National Bank of Ethiopia). We have applied the
same process, described above, in dealing with these data problems (using the figure listed in the year of
publication, for that year, and not adjusting based on different figures reported in later reports).
We can only speculate why the figures vary from report to report. However, there is the potential
for these figures to be politicized in seeking to support a narrative of economic transformation
promoted by the government, and as a means to demonstrate advancement toward the goals outlined
in the Growth and Transformation Plans. Consider the abovementioned data of agriculture as a share
of GDP for 2010/11, listed as 41.1% for that year of publication (NBE 2011), while later years change
the figure for 2010/11 to 45.3% (NBE 2012, 2013), 44.4% (NBE 2014, 2015), and 44.7% (NBE 2016).
This could be used as a potential means to show how, during the most recent year, the year of
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publication, economic transformation is taking place, while the figure is adjusted (increased) in later
years when that figure is used for comparative purposes (thus showing high rates of change to support
the transformation narrative). We cannot confirm this is the reason for data inconsistency, or if other
methodological changes were occurring. The adjustments do not appear to be consistent, suggesting
that, if methodological changes were taking place, they would be consistent after a certain point, but
they are not. Additionally, if these are corrections, it would be expected that a degree of consistency
would exist for past years, once corrected, but this is also not the case. What we can say with certainty
is that the data is inconsistent, and should be used with caution. Users of these datasets should know
that there is a significant degree of uncertainty with regard to the actual figures and which reports
ought to be used to ascertain the most accurate figures. One way that we have encouraged the taking
of a cautionary approach to using the share of the economy data (which was the most problematic
dataset), is by not including a data table for that figure (e.g., in Figure 1), emphasizing trends over
specific figures. Whereas, for other figures, we have provided accompanying data tables. This is not
to suggest that the other data was consistent, as it was not, but the data on the sectoral share of the
economy in the National Bank of Ethiopia reports presented the greatest inconsistencies.
3. Results
Is Ethiopia’s economy transforming? The Government of Ethiopia’s narrative suggests that it
is facilitating significant economic transformation (MoFED 2014, 2017), and this is the first narrative
we seek to evaluate. The second Growth and Transformation Plan (2015/16 to 2019/20) places a
strong emphasis on developing the industrial sector (NPC 2016). The government has sought to
enable the industrial transformation with the establishment of industrial parks throughout the country.
Ethiopia completed the construction of the first industrial zone in Dukem in 2008, a second in Addis
Ababa in 2014, and a third in Hawassa in 2016. There are at least 20 more either up-and-running or in
construction (ABP 2017). In line with the Growth and Transformation Plan for the country (NPC 2016),
this is one of the focal initiatives designed to transform the economy.
According to the National Bank of Ethiopia, the share of agriculture in the GDP declined slightly over
the last two decades, with industry and services respectively increasing. The exception to the minor shifts
is the final year for which we have data, 2016/17, where industry made a significant increase, rising from
17% to 25% as a share of the GDP (both agriculture and services declined relative to industry growth).
The rise of industry as a share of the GDP in this year aligns with changes in the country, in that several
industrial parks were completed or near completion in the 2016/17 report year (e.g., Kombolcha and
Mekelle industrial parks). It does appear that the emphasis placed on industrial parks by the Government
of Ethiopia, as a means of economic transformation, is resulting in change. It remains to be seen to
what extent this change will be sustained, or increased, in the years to come. At this junction, we have
indications of long-term stability on the macroscale regarding the sectoral shares of the economy, with
indications that industry may play a more significant role in the years to come.
The second narrative that we evaluate is a narrative of a rapidly growing economy. While there is
some divergence between its own data and that of the World Bank, both datasets identify Ethiopia
as one of the fastest growing economies in Africa and, in fact, the world, something that has been
sustained since 2003 (see Figure 2; Table 2). The rapid growth started from a relative point, as Ethiopia
had one of the world’s lowest per capita GDP levels and, despite much growth, it still remains as
one of the world’s lowest. This is noteworthy because the economic gains are relative to the size of
the economy at the outset. Notable is that the growth rates listed by the Government of Ethiopia are
not consistently higher than the World Bank, as one might expect if the data was serving political
objectives or being inflated. Furthermore, the actual data is counter to claims made by other scholars,
such as Mandefro and Jerven (2015, p. 1), who claim third party sources “consistently show a lower
GDP growth rate.” A long-term assessment of primary data presents a more complicated narrative,
wherein the rates presented by the Government of Ethiopia are not consistently higher. As shown in
Figure 2, the World Bank growth rates were actually higher than the Government of Ethiopia in ten of
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the last eighteen years. Mandefro (2016) references IMF data from two years to support the claim that
the Government of Ethiopia inflates growth rate data, also years that the World Bank rate was lower
than the Government of Ethiopia. However, those years are not representative of the overall trend.
It is worth noting that, in recent years (since 2013/14), the rates of the Government of Ethiopia have
been higher than the World Bank.
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Figure 1. Sectors by Share of the Economy, 19 –20 . Source: NBE 20 5, 06, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010,
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. Note: Due to the problematic and inconsistent nature of the
data on the sectors by share of the economy, we have not included the figures in a table. There are
different figures listed in various reports and, as a result, we are not confident the figures are accurate
(see Methodology section). Instead, we present only Figure 1, without an ac mpanying data table, to
highlight the macrolevel trends. Further research could investigate the sectoral shares of the economy
by recalculating the data in the National Bank of Ethiopia annual reports.
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Figure 2. Economic Growth Rates and Size of the Economy. Source: NBE 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009,
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017; World Bank 2018. Note: World Bank (2018) data is based
on the Gregorian year, while the National Bank of Ethiopia uses the Ethiopian calendar. We have
used the latter of the years covered in the Ethiopian calendar (i.e., 2005 of 2004/05, as that covers the
majority of the period; the Ethiopian year runs from September 11 to September 10). As a result of this
difference, the two figures are not directly comparable. Caution should be taken when making direct
comparisons, given these differences.
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Table 2. Economic Growth Rates (%) and Size of the Economy (US$).
Growth Rate (GoE) Growth Rate (WB) GDP, Billions (WB)
99/00 5.4 6.1 8.2
00/01 7.4 8.3 8.2
01/02 −0.3 1.5 7.9
02/03 −3.3 −2.2 8.6
03/04 11.1 13.6 10.1
04/05 8.8 11.8 12.4
05/06 9.6 10.8 15.3
06/07 11.4 11.5 19.7
07/08 11.6 10.8 27.1
08/09 9.9 8.8 32.4
09/10 10.4 12.6 29.9
10/11 11.4 11.2 32
11/12 8.8 8.7 43.3
12/13 9.7 10.6 47.7
13/14 10.3 10.3 55.6
14/15 10.2 10 64.5
15/16 8 7.6 73
16/17 10.9 10.3 80.6
Source: NBE 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017; World Bank 2018. Note: For
the GDP figure, we have adopted the World Bank (2018) data, in current US$, as there are complex issues related to
changes in the value of the currency. The National Bank of Ethiopia reports also list GDP at Constant Basic Prices,
however, these are listed in ETB. Within the time period covered, there were significant fluctuations of the currency,
including large devaluations, which took place within a fiscal year. As our purpose is to highlight trends, we have
not reanalyzed the GDP figures from the NBE reports.
The third narrative we evaluate is the commonly stated description that agriculture is the
backbone of the Ethiopian economy, and contributes the largest share of GDP, employment, and
exports (e.g., Cochrane 2017; Haylemariam 2017; Loening et al. 2009). We analyze this narrative
using export and import trade data, obtained from the National Bank of Ethiopia, and compare that
with other available data. Indeed, the Ethiopian economy and the export market is dominated by
agricultural commodities, with coffee playing a critical role amongst the exported commodities. Of the
twelve key export commodities, as determined by the National Bank of Ethiopia, six are agricultural
(coffee, fruits and vegetables, pulses, flowers, oilseeds, and khat). The data from the National Bank
of Ethiopia indicate that these six commodities never account for less than 60% of all export value
(Figure 3). Less well known is the important role that livestock and livestock-related commodities play
in Ethiopia’s export market, accounting for an additional three of the twelve key commodities (leather,
meat, and live animals). The livestock and livestock-related commodities account for approximately
a tenth of the exports, by value. These two commodity types (agriculture and livestock), together,
accounted for no less than 70% of all export value, in every year between 2002/03 and 2016/17.
It is worth noting some emerging trends from the export data. While agricultural and
livestock-related commodities were consistently important throughout the time period, there are
emerging commodities. For example, electricity emerges as a new key export commodity in 2012/13
(Table 3), but has remained relatively minor in the overall export landscape. However, with the
development of large-scale hydroelectric dams, we expect that this figure will increase in the coming
years and may become a vital component of the export market (Department of Commerce 2017a).
In addition to general rises in the total value of exports over the time period (see Table 5), the number
of trade destinations for Ethiopian export commodities nearly doubled. This indicates the relatively
narrow export commodity types (primarily agricultural and livestock) have a diversified global market
(ERCA 2018).
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Table 3. Major Export Items, by Value in US$ Millions.
Coffee Oilseeds Pulses Fruits &Vegetables Khat Flowers Leather Meat
Live
Animals Gold Electricity Other
02/03 165.3 46.1 20 9.6 58 - 52.2 2.4 0.5 42.1 - 86.7
03/04 223.5 82.7 22.6 12.7 88 2.3 43.6 7.7 1.9 48.7 - 69.2
04/05 335.4 102.3 35.5 16.1 100 7.8 63.7 14.6 12.8 52.5 - 85
5/06 354.3 211.4 37 13.2 89.1 1.8 75 18.5 27.6 64.7 - 87.8
06/07 424.2 187.4 70.3 16.2 92.8 63.6 89.6 15.5 35.8 97 - 91.8
07/08 524.5 218.8 143.6 12.8 108 111.8 99.2 20.9 40.9 78.8 - 106.3
08/09 375.9 356.1 90.7 12.1 139 130.7 75.3 26.6 52.7 97.8 - 91.3
9/10 528.3 358.5 130.1 31.5 210 170.2 56.4 34 90.7 281 - 112.5
10/11 841.8 326.6 137.9 31.5 238 175.3 103.8 63.3 147.9 462 - 219
11/12 833.1 472.3 159.7 44.9 240 197 109.9 78.8 207.1 602 - 207.1
12/13 745.1 437.1 232.5 43.7 271 186.1 120.6 74.1 166 584 34.6 214.9
13/14 714.4 651.9 250.7 45.9 297 199.7 129.8 74.6 186.7 456 45.3 247.4
14/15 780.5 510.1 219.9 47.6 272 203.1 131.6 92.8 148.5 319 42.8 251.4
15/16 722.7 477.2 232.4 53.7 263 225.3 115.3 96.4 147.8 291 31.5 212.3
6/17 883.2 351 279.9 56.1 73 218.5 114 9 .7 67.6 209 73.4 283.2
Source: NBE 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.
The import trends also shed light on the ways in which the economy of Ethiopia is changing
over time. The 2016/17 Annual Report of the National Bank of Ethiopia lists 21 major imports, by
year, going back more than three decades. In line with the export data, we present the trends from
2002/03 to 2016/17 (Figure 4; Table 4). To enhance readability of the figure and table, we have removed
10 commodities that had relatively lower levels of imports, by value (namely: beverages, tobacco,
petroleum crude, chemicals, medical and pharmaceutical products, soap and polish, paper and paper
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manfc., glass and glassware, grain, and telecom. appara.), resulting in 11 major imports listed in
Figure 4 (namely: food and live animals, petroleum products, fertilizers, rubber products, textiles,
clothing, metal and metal manfc., machinery and aircraft, road motor vehicles, electrical materials,
and others). It is notable that the listing of “grain” is actually included in the “food and live animals”
category, however, its inclusion highlights specific years when grain imports double or triple the norm,
namely, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2011/12, and 2012/13, aligned with drought situations.Economies 2018, 6, 64 9 of 16 
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ar m ny indications there are errors in the Annex (NBE 2016, p. 122), such as figures increasing or
decreasing ten-fold, figures repeated exactly for multiple commodities, and table formatting errors.
Some commodities (NBE 2016, p. 123) app ar ac urate, however, b cause there were clear errors in
lf th dataset, we have left this year blank.
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02/03 1,697,566 2,463,917 462,662 376,787 599,604 478,039 1,311,504 1,963,002 1,817,630 1,059,754 2,696,596
03/04 1,981,297 2,608,285 923,523 417,410 606,295 601,949 2,012,945 2,397,183 2,124,501 2,447,540 4,152,333
04/05 1,566,093 5,736,666 1,055,294 536,827 774,285 836,015 3,476,768 4,553,244 2,811,972 3,062,726 4,853,003
05/06 2,139,779 7,422,807 1,180,768 730,113 1,065,381 1,291,287 4,157,675 5,305,516 4,183,804 2,978,793 6,366,919
06/07 1,799,700 7,524,664 933,867 838,145 808,907 1,523,051 4,460,322 7,036,854 6,062,546 2,968,701 7,829,238
07/08 2,499,134 15,076,123 2,828,101 1,030,557 986,145 1,198,037 7,051,109 7,118,469 4,279,547 4,404,967 12,489,774
08/09 7,251,053 17,219,182 3,008,355 1,422,155 1,023,983 1,124,962 7,990,303 8,713,241 4,859,888 5,866,530 20,895,905
09/10 7,713,047 18,891,592 3,221,932 2,220,337 1,476,236 2,433,694 11,618,002 12,278,627 8,503,493 7,728,010 25,639,499
10/11 3,966,149 22,299,884 5,665,269 2,515,039 1,982,717 2,430,231 10,778,367 16,015,252 13,180,603 7,195,551 34,861,069
11/12 12,692,391 35,868,583 10,503,430 3,373,729 2,892,344 4,218,310 19,678,247 20,529,023 17,831,730 8,696,845 43,405,637
12/13 11,635,650 26,565,255 5,332,244 4,030,338 2,744,224 4,449,522 21,688,480 28,035,377 20,493,273 11,912,689 46,476,571
13/14 9,165,826 47,619,870 7,808,484 5,858,244 4,622,749 5,442,436 29,939,445 36,774,861 23,820,186 22,735,293 54,917,318
14/15 13,155,398 39,822,539 8,641,772 5,979,668 5,819,130 6,802,500 45,631,138 45,707,264 31,471,855 43,251,536 69,309,407
15/16
16/17 14,830,981 37,325,714 12,279,084 6,708,574 5,416,692 8,529,700 41,572,482 56,981,595 33,498,960 30,086,052 78,480,806
Source: NBE 2016, 2017.
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The import data provides insight into where the economy is reliant upon the global market to meet
domestic demand and, also, identifies some apparent contradictions. Petroleum is imported as Ethiopia
does not have domestic supplies (or, at least, no supplies of significant production levels to date), which
are related to the ability to manufacture synthetic fertilizers and rubber products. Areas where the
nation needs greater capacity is in mining exploration and development, to exploit existing resources,
and thereby provide domestic supplies for the production of metal and electrical commodities
(Department of Commerce 2017b). The rapid growth and continued success of Ethiopian Airlines
explains the role of machinery and aircraft imports. Despite high tariffs and strong governmental
efforts to have motor vehicle manufacturing done domestically, the supply has continued to reply
upon international sources with the percentage of imports by value for motor vehicles remaining
relatively stable throughout the period. The contradictions that emerge are that Ethiopia exports food
and live animals which, together, comprise the vast majority of exports, yet, it also has high levels of
imports of food and live animals. This apparent contradiction is explained, in part, by commodity type
demand, with some food imports being those that are not predominately grown or exported, such as
rice. However, the import of grains suggests another story, one that highlights the vulnerability of
the nation to drought, and the need for imports to provide emergency food aid. Notably, the import
data is not government imports, but are inclusive of the private sector, and as it relates to grains, this
includes the donor and NGO community, which procure food commodities for distribution in drought
years (USDA 2016). Further studies are needed to better assess the specifics of the import and export
of food and live animals. Given that cotton is one of Ethiopia’s major cash crops, one might not expect
to see significant imports of textiles and clothing, but clothing is a significant import item. There are
indications that this relates to demand being greater than supply, limitations of domestic production
capacity, higher comparative production costs, as well as a general trend toward a declining area used
for cotton production in Ethiopia (USDA 2018). Further research is needed on that subsector of the
agricultural economy to better assess the trends and potential opportunities.
The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC 2018) offers a breakdown of imports for a
single year, 2016, showing that the single largest import item for that year was refined petroleum,
accounting for 10.1% of all imports. The OEC categorization of “machines” (an aggregated category
of commodities) accounted for 27% of all imports. Notably, the “machines” category did not include
transportation, which accounted for 13% of imports in that year (primarily planes, trucks, and cars).
This aligns with the data presented by the National Bank of Ethiopia, although categorized slightly
differently. Although the data period is limited, the World Bank (2018) shows that, in relation to
the rapidly growing economy, imports of goods and services as a percentage of the GDP has been
declining, from nearly 32% in 2011, to 23.7% in 2017. This provides important context as, at face value,
the rising cost of imports over time appears to be a negative trend, however, when contextualized with
the broader economic growth, the percentage of imports in relation to the overall GDP is declining.
An emerging narrative, raising concerns for many, is the level of debt in many African nations,
particularly, as new forms of financing have emerged, with many reports focusing on the role of China
(AlJazeera 2018; Kpodo 2018; Reuters 2018). With regard to its lending status, Ethiopia was recently
downgraded to “high risk of debt distress” (Madowo 2018), and from “moderately stressed” to “highly
stressed” (Anberbir 2018). The narratives of debt, alongside these rating changes, have resulted in
lending policy changes, garnering the attention of Ethiopian politicians. Indeed, since a low in 2006 of
US$ 2.3 billion, external debt has ballooned to US$ 23.1 billion in 2016 (Figure 5; Table 5), a ten-fold
increase of external debt in a ten-year period. The narratives of rising debt are well founded, as are
the concerns, particularly for Ethiopia. Compounding the rise of external debt is the increasing trade
deficit, notably, since 2014, when export value declines were not matched with equal declines in import
values, resulting in a widening of the gap. In addition to external debt and trade deficit challenges, the
government may face additional financial pressure, as there have been some large initiatives, launched
since the inauguration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The narrative of debt, however, has primarily
focused on China. Obtaining data on the exact sources of all the nation’s debt is challenging, however,
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between 2000 and 2014, Ethiopia received US$ 12 billion in loans from China (New Business Ethiopia
2018). This indicates that, while China is playing a key role in the Ethiopian debt crisis, other lenders
account for approximately half of the current debt load. Identifying China as being at fault presents
only part of the picture.
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Figure 5. External Debt and Trade Balance. Source: World Bank 2018. Note: The OEC (OEC) (2018)
presents different data and a different trend for import/export value for this period. The OEC uses
the United Nations Statistical Division data, cleaned by the BACI International Trade Database. It is
unclear how the OEC dealt with changing currency values over the period, and the year for which
the value has been based upon (if this was done, alternatively, it may present figures in that year as
of that year’s currency value). Due to the lack of clarity with the OEC data, we have opted to use the
World Bank data. We have not offered comparisons to the OEC data, as it is unclear how comparable
the datasets actually are.
Table 5. External Debt and Trade Balance.
Export Value
(2018 US$, 2000 = 100)
Import Value
(2018 US$, 2000 = 100)
Debt Stocks
(2018 US$ Billions)
99 96.2 122 5.6
00 100 100 5.5
01 93.7 143.7 5.8
02 98.9 126.4 6.6
03 102.2 213.1 7.3
04 139.7 228 6.6
05 186 324.9 6.2
06 214.8 413.1 2.3
07 263 460.9 2.7
08 329.8 656.7 2.9
09 333.2 608.4 5.4
10 479.7 682.5 7.3
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Table 5. Cont.
Export Value
(2018 US$, 2000 = 100)
Import Value
(2018 US$, 2000 = 100)
Debt Stocks
(2018 US$ Billions)
11 592.1 705.8 8.6
12 595.4 945.2 10.5
13 640.8 969.9 12.6
14 705.7 1233.8 16.3
15 628 1341.9 20.1
16 601 1316.1 23.1
Source: World Bank 2018. Note: The export values listed in Tables 3 and 5 differ. One reason for this is that the
World Bank uses value in US$ current (2018), whereas the National Bank of Ethiopia annual reports are figures in
US$ for that specific year. We have not listed the total value in Table 3 because it has not been adjusted against any
constant value and, instead, only list the total value of exports in Table 5.
4. Discussion
There are many narratives, and counter-narratives, about the macroeconomy of Ethiopia
(Mandefro 2016). Many of these narratives, however, are based upon single data points, or specific
years. This article presented data over a two-decade period to assess the trends and reflect on four of
the common narratives. The greatest challenge in assessing these narratives, as outlined in the methods
section, is data inconsistency. Specifically, data points from a single governmental agency vary from
report to report. This presents a methodological problem for analysis but, more fundamentally, it poses
a problem for understanding the reality of the economy, as the variances translate into millions of
Ethiopian birr. There is speculation (and accusation) that some figures are intentionally manipulated
to promote a narrative of economic growth (see Mandefro 2016). We have identified some instances
where the changed figures could be used in this way, but we have also identified changes where the
opposite is the case. We echo the calls made by others that there is a critical need to improve the
capacity of national statistical agencies, as well as others, such as agencies dealing with customs, trade,
and finance (Carletto et al. 2015; Jerven 2013; Sandefur and Glassman 2015; Sundaram 2016).
The first narrative that we addressed was that of the narrative of economic transformation, as
assessed by the share of sectors in the economy over time. We found, as the Government of Ethiopia
advocates, that the share of agriculture has slightly declined, while the service and industrial sectors
have slightly risen. The exception to these minor shifts was the final year for which we have data,
2016, when the industrial sector grew significantly (from 17% to 25%). This occurred in a year when
several industrial parks were opening and/or near completion. However, the data on the share of each
sector in the economy was particularly problematic in terms of displaying multiple inconsistencies.
The rise of the industrial sector has not yet resulted in the addition of a new category in the list of
key export commodities. However, looking at the history of the National Bank of Ethiopia annual
reports, it appears that the addition of key commodities occurs after several years of significant exports
begin. For example, electricity was not listed until the 2014/15 annual report but, when it was listed,
it also provided export figures for the newly introduced key commodity for 2012/13 and 2013/14.
We anticipate a similar process may occur for the industrial sector.
The second narrative addressed rapid economic growth and, secondly, the accusation of inflated
growth figures by the Government of Ethiopia. On the sustained high growth rate, the data from
governmental and third-party sources confirm that economic growth has been high and sustained.
The exact nature of that growth varies based on the source. We compared the growth rates presented
by the Government of Ethiopia and the World Bank, as it is claimed that the Government of Ethiopia
inflates the rates to present a brighter economic picture than is reality. It is not possible to directly
compare these two datasets because they operate on different fiscal calendars. However, the claim that
the Government of Ethiopia consistently inflates the figures higher than third parties was not found
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to be accurate over the long term. It was the case that, in the most recent years (2014–2017), the rates
listed by the Government of Ethiopia were higher than the World Bank, but this was not consistently
the case for the 18 years for which we have data.
The third narrative analyzed was that of Ethiopia being an agricultural economy, often with
non-specific figures given to support this general description. We found that agricultural commodities
were, consistently, the dominant component of exported goods, in terms of value. Indeed, the
importance of the agricultural sector may be greater than is sometimes described, as the agricultural
share of the export market does not drop below 60% in any year in the analyzed period. If one includes
livestock-related export commodities, the two sectors (agriculture and livestock) do not comprise
less than 70% of export commodities, by value, during the period. Thus, the narrative may, in fact,
understate the extent to which Ethiopia is reliant upon agricultural commodities within its economy,
and, specifically, within its exported commodities. The rise of electricity exports, starting in 2012/13,
and the emerging industrial sector, may diversify the export market in the coming years. However,
the extent of this change remains to be seen. For the near- and medium-term, Ethiopia’s key export
commodities will continue to be agricultural. This is well recognized by the Government of Ethiopia,
which views enhancing agricultural productivity as a critical area for development (NPC 2016). In this
paper, we have not addressed questions regarding the distribution of benefits within the transformation
of the economy. It is well worth noting that a focus on growth and productivity does not equate with
supporting small-holder farmers, who are the majority of the population of the nation, nor those living
outside of the high production potential areas (Cochrane 2017). In fact, that growth may come at
their expense. The import data presented insight into the economy, as well as the vulnerabilities of
the agricultural sector, particularly, the inability to consistently meet domestic needs during years
of drought.
The fourth narrative emerged more recently, that of African nations becoming heavily indebted
and, in particular, highlighting the role of China as a new, problematic lender. The narrative of debt is
well substantiated, with Ethiopian debt rising ten-fold during a period of a single decade, resulting in
the downgrading of the Government of Ethiopia by some lending agencies, due to concerns about high
levels of debt and the potential for debt distress in the economy. This was combined with a widening
of the import–export trade deficit, signaling that the economic woes may pose yet more challenges.
Given changes in 2018, we anticipate that the debt challenge may worsen still. However, the singling
out of the role of China, with regard to the debt crisis in Ethiopia, is only part of the story. Based on the
available data, it appears that China is the largest single lender to Ethiopia. However, a host of other
lenders have also contributed to the current level of debt, with lenders other than China accounting for
approximately half of the debt load.
5. Conclusions
This article analyzed long-term data as a means to evaluate four common narratives about the
macroeconomy of Ethiopia. In some cases, we found that the narratives are not supported by available
data, in other cases, that the narratives were not complete, and, in yet others, that the dominant
narrative is well founded. In analyzing these narratives, we have found that many researchers,
ourselves included, have overly relied upon secondary sources, single data points, and specific years
for the generalized claims made. Based upon the findings of this paper, we call upon researchers to
regularly return to original data sources to verify the claims, even when they exist in peer reviewed
articles or reports from well-respected international agencies. Doing so also functions as a means to
regularly challenge our own assumptions and assess if the trends are consistent over the long term, or if
they require updating due to more recent changes. As has been noted by many (e.g., Carletto et al. 2015;
Jerven 2013; Sandefur and Glassman 2015; Sundaram 2016), there is a need to invest in better data
collection, to improve data analyses and to ensure the methodologies used are sound and suited to
the respective objective. In the best-case scenario, these changes will occur over the medium and long
term. Unless and until these changes occur, utilization of the available data should be done with more
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critical engagement, as we have identified challenges of inconsistency with the figures. In conveying
this information, readers should be cognizant of the inconsistencies, and the potential ways in which
data may be political and politicized.
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